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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
By IVAN C. RUTLEDGE*
INCE the First World War the United States Supreme Court
has found that it has powers theretofore disclaimed in the field
of civil liberties.1 The Fourteenth Amendment has been found to be
available to protect a person against governmental action on the part
of a state which would without due process deprive him of freedom
to disseminate information or freedom of worship. No attempt is
here made to formulate a definition of religion or to delineate the
concept of separation of church and state, except as it may become
pertinent in analysis of judicial opinions. It is sufficient for present
purposes if the claim of religion is raised and adjudicated in course
of reaching a decision on the limits of the power of one of the states
to act in the premises. Emphasis is placed on the determinations of
the court of last resort, which, as matters now stand as indicated
above, is the United States Supreme Court.
Two of the subtitles in the field of civil liberties were mentioned
above without making an exhaustive catalogue of the rubrics that fall
within this area. Other phases of civil rights as distinguished from
claims which are substantially and directly connected with property
or economic interests, had previously to 1925 received attention by
the Supreme Court when the Fourteenth Amendment was invoked.!
But the often close relationship of freedom of the press with free-
dom of religion makes it appropriate to consider the year in which
Gitlow v. New York3 was handed down as the starting point.
Probably no claim of freedom of religion could have been made in
Gitlow v. New York, which was the progenitor of the expanded mean-
ing given to the Fourteenth Amendment. It should not be overlooked,
however, that in applying the First Amendment the Court had ap-
proved Jefferson's distinction between the profession or propagation
of principles and the eruption of those principles into overt acts
against peace and good order. That interpretation was applied in a
* Professor of Law, Mercer University.
1. See Warren, "The New 'Liberty' of the Fourteenth Amendment," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431 (1926).
This able discussion reviews the repeated attempts to bring sundry civil rights within this Amend-
ment.
2. For example, see Stumberg, "State Supervision of Education and the Fourteenth Amendment,"
4 Texas Law Review 93 (1925).
3. 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
( 141 )
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case involving a claim of religious freedom.' It is submitted that such a
distinction protects agitation of principles whether denominated re-
ligious, political, social, economic, or moral. If zealous loyalty and
impassioned adherence are characteristics which mark the holder of
religious principles, why may not Gitlow, and other advocates of
salvation through violence, be categoried as religionists? However,
the undisputed evidence was that Gitlow, as business manager of a
Left Wing section of the Socialist party, organized in New York in
i919, was responsible for the circulation of a "Manifesto" of which
some sixteen thousand copies were printed, calling on the proletariat
of the world to final struggle by mass industrial revolt, and denounc-
ing parliamentary methods in achieving "the full and free social and
individual autonomy of the Communist order." He was convicted of
teaching the overthrow of government by force under a New York
criminal statute. The Supreme Court "assumed" that "for present
purposes .. . freedom of speech and of the press are among the
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the states." The Court went on to
affirm the conviction on the ground that the statute as applied was
a reasonable safeguard against danger to public peace and the secur-
ity of the state. It held that the danger from such utterances as those
of which the prisoner stood convicted need not be measured "in the
nice balance of a jeweler's scale."' In this diffident manner did the
Court assume the censorship of state legislation in respect to freedom
of expression. It was to carry this burden for fifteen years before
adding the problem of claims of freedom of religion, in Cantwell v.
Connecticut.6
The thread of doctrine which finds expression in this period is that
state regulation which is so loosely drawn' or construed' or applied 9
as to operate as a prior restraint on innocent expression is unconstitu-
tional. Unless states can devise criminal or injunctive sanctions which
will operate with precision only against those whose conduct is harm-
ful to public interests which may legitimately be protected, the public
interest for which protection is desired will have to suffer. Some
specific rules are evolved: Innocuous speeches cannot be punished be-
4. Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145 (1879). The distinction here summarized was expounded at
page 163. The question in the case was whether Congress could make bigamy a crime when the
second marriage was performed by a church pursuant to its doctrines that its members must prac-
tise polygamy.
5. This holding represented an apparent qualification of the "clear and present danger" require-
ment necessary to Congressional curtailment of freedom of Speech as announced by Mr. Justice
Holmes and laid down by the Court in Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47 (1919). The state legislature
has some latitude in deciding what speech may later erupt into a clear danger which would at that
time constitute a sudden threat to public safety.
6. 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
7. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
8. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927). This was the first case in which a claim of freedom
of speech was effective against a state statute. Not only must the legislature avoid censorship but it
must not punish for publication of language which falls short of advocating unlawful acts. The
requirement of a clear and present danger, however, was not made.
9. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937).
GEORGIA BAR JOURNAL
cause of sponsorship by organizations having forbidden objectives."
Dissemination of non-commercial literature in the public streets can-
not be subjected to discretionary licensing" or forbidden 2 in order to
keep the streets clean, or to prevent breaches of the peace. A corpora-
tion" or individual is entitled to protection from injunctive suppres-
sion 5 or burdensome taxation 6 of a newspaper. If the statute is care-
fully drawn and applied, it must nevertheless meet the "clear and
present danger" test of Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. U. S.' 7 Al-
though there was some wavering in the Gitlow case and in Fiske v.
Kansas8 about the verbal formulation of the judicial attitude in which
to inspect a statute against which a claim of freedom of speech, press,
or assembly is made, the classic motto was adhered to in Herndon v.
Lowry"° in 1937 and in subsequent cases. "Clear and present danger"
in this connection has to do with the technique of making factual
determinations for purposes of constitutionality." One approach is
to say that the challenger of constitutionality bears the risk of fail-
ing to persuade the court that the legislative determination of the
need for the questioned enactment is unreasonable. "Clear and present
danger" seems to be somewhere close to the opposite.
Even the dissenting justices in Gitlow v. New York agreed with the
rest of the Court that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is a restriction on state power to regulate freedom of
speech, though Mr. Justice Holmes in the dissenting opinion speculat-
ed that state legislatures have greater latitude thereunder than does
Congress under the First Amendment. No distinction was made, in
treatment of freedom of speech, among opinions on political, social,
economic, and religious questions. On the other hand, the Court de-
clined to hear claims based on a constitutional guaranty of freedom
of religion, on the ground that no federal question was involved.
Earlier, Mr. Justice McReynolds for the Court in Meyer v. Ne-
braska"' had said:
"Without doubt it (the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment) denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
10. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937).
11. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
12. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
13. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936).
14. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1930).
15. Ibid.
16. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936).
17. 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
18. 274 U. S. 380 (1927).
19. 301 U. S. 242 (1937).
20. On this general subject see Bikle, "Judicial Determination of Questions of Facts Affecting the
Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 6 (1924).
21. 262 U. S. 390 (1923). The selection is at page 399.
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to marry, to establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as es-
sential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
This asseveration proved to be endowed at least in part with
prophetic insight. Seventeen years later in Cantwell v. Connecticut a
unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, swept the
free exercise of religion into the palladium of federally protected
activities. In the meantime the Court in 1938 had struck down a city
ordinance as unconstitutionally infringing freedom to disseminate
literature,22 which five months previously it had refused to consider.
The previous attack being based on freedom of religion, the Court
had dismissed the appeal on the ground that no federal question was
involved.23 Such a determination seemed at the time to be well on the
way to crystallizing into a fixed rule, quite apart from the negative
evidence afforded by the long-standing application of the Fourteenth
Amendment principally to protect corporations and business men,
and only occasionally minority groups as such.23a In Coale v. Pear-
son24 the appeal was dismissed as lacking a substantial federal ques-
tion. The appellant unsuccessfully sought equitable relief in the Mary-
land courts from attending classes in the military department of the
University of Maryland as a condition to being reinstated as a stu-
dent. He claimed to be a sincere, religious conscientious objejctor to
preparation for war. 5 A similar claim, stemming from Methodist and
Epworth League teachings as to the conscientious right to be a pacifist,
was presented in Hamilton v. Regent of the University of California.6
The Court held that no constitutional question could be based on
conscientious beliefs which made it necessary for appellants to pay for
their education in a non-tax-supported institution. However, Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo, concurring, faced the question of applicability of the
Fourteenth Amendment and "assumed" that the religious liberty
protected by the First Amendment is protected by the Fourteenth.
Justices Brandeis and Stone joined him. This minority concurrence
seemed to have had no influence, however, when Dorothy Leoles ap-
pealed from the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia. Her appeal
was dismissed as presenting no federal question,27 just as in the Cole-
22. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444.
23. Coleman v. Griffin, 302 U. S. 636 (1937).
23a. See Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 393
U. S. 77, 90 (1938).
24. 290 U. S. 597 (1933).
25. Pearson v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 Atl. 54 (193.3).
26. 293 U. S. 245 (1934). All students were required to take courses in military science as a con-
dition of remaining in school.
27. Leoles v. Landers, 302 U. S. 656 (1937).
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man case28 at the same 1937 term. According to the Georgia report
of the Leoles case," the only questions in the case were whether the
expulsion of the petitioner from public school for refusal to salute
the United States flag infringed the state constitution or the Fourteenth
Amendment. The petitioner claimed to be a loyal citizen, a believer
in the American form of government, and a sincere believer that
God's teachings forbid the worship of any emblem or image, and that
for her to salute the flag would be worshipping an emblem or image.
The dismissals of the appeals of Coleman and Leoles at the 1937
term, with the success of Lovell five months later against the same
ordinance Coleman had attacked, suggest that the majority in Hamil-
ton v. The Regents may have omitted to discuss the content of the
Fourteenth Amendment by design. These three cases were cited as
authority for dismissing the appeal of John and Ella Hering against
the New Jersey state board of education two weeks prior to the
decision in Lovell v. Griffin.3" In disposing of the question of religious
freedom the Supreme Court of New Jersey had said that the com-
mand of the statute requiring a flag salute on pain of expulsion from
the public schools could in no sense interfere with religious freedom
because it is "by no stretch of the imagination" a religious rite, and
because attendance at the public schools is not required."'
A contrary view of Hamilton v. The Regents and the subsequent
dismissals of appeals was taken by the learned judge in Gabrielli v.
Knickerbocker.3 2 He held that religious liberty is included within the
"liberty" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but that the public school requirement of a flag salute
is not repugnant to it, just as the requirement of military science in a
state university is not. But the fact remains that the Fourteenth
Amendment had not as yet been applied on behalf of a claim of re-
ligion to strike down a state regulation. This alone would perhaps
not be significant had not the ordinance of the City of Griffin, Geor-
gia, escaped on the one test of religious freedom and been caught on
the other of freedom of the press, as pointed out above.
Nevertheless the Cantwell case two years later proved the vitality
of the concurrence in the Hamilton case and altered the significance
of the dismissals of appeals in the flag salute cases decided prior to
1940. It also cast doubt on what the Court would do with an appeal
like that in the Coleman case, though the Lovell case and others on
28. Supra note 23.
29. Leoles v. Landers, 184 Ga. 580, 192 S. E. 218 (1937).
30. Supra note 22.
31. Hering v. Board of Education, 117 N. J. L. 455, 189 AtI. 629 (1937). Of course, attendance at
school was required and therefore the result was either submission to the salute or greater expense
of schooling or criminal prosecution. In the Hamilton case liability to criminal prosecution was
not involved.
32. 12 Cal. (2d) 85, 82 Pac. (2d) 391 (1938), cert. denied 306 U. S. 621 (1939). See Johnson v.
Deerfield, 25 F. Supp. 918 (D. Mass. 1939), aff'd 306 U. S. 621 (1939).
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freedom to distribute pamphlets had made this question to an extent
academic. Cantwell violated a statute which required him to get a
permit to solicit any valuable thing for any alleged religiouso cause.
Instead, without the permit, he went into a Roman Catholic neighbor-
hood with a phonograph and phonograph records and books contain-
ing highly offensive strictures on the Roman Catholic Church in par-
ticular and on organized religion in general. Playing a record was
preliminary to an effort to sell a book, and if he failed to make a sale
he would solicit contributions toward the publication of pamphlets,
one of which would be given the contributor on condition that he read
it. He stopped two men on the street and received permission to play
a record. Then they became incensed and told him to be on his way.
He left. He was convicted of a common law breach of the peace and
of violation of the statute. The conviction was reversed by the Su-
ureme Court on both counts. By analogy to dissemination of informa-
tion, the exercise of religion is to be free from prior restraint. It is
recognized that arbitrary action by the licensing officer in refusing to
classify a cause as religious was made subject to judicial correction,
but as in Near v. Minnesota" a judicial remedy does not relieve the
regulated party of a prior restraint, which is a forbidden burden.
The existence of a public interest to be protected is recognized as in
Gitlow v. New York, but as in Schneider v. New Jersey34 the constitu-
tional guaranty may fall in the way of the more efficient and con-
venient method of protection. Neutrality towards differences in re-
ligious faith is as emphatic a command as impartiality in matters of
political belief. A method less burdensome to religious propaganda
must be devised to protect the public from fraudulent solicitation.
In i89o Charles E Shattuck35 concluded that the historic meaning
of "liberty" in the standard form due process clause is limited to the
habeas corpus principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence. It may be
inferred that his conclusion on "life" and "property" would have been
parallel: "life" means biological existence, and "property" means
rights recognized by law eo nomine, including choses in action but
possibly excluding good will and certainly excluding business oppor-
tunities or expectancies of property, just as "liberty" means the oppo-
site of imprisonment of the body. He also observed that courts were
not hewing to that line, and were bringing under the operation of the
due process clause certain newcomer rights called civil rights. He
pointed out that the broad construction was not the one intended be-
cause the historic terms had been employed, and because certain civil
rights were given "absolute" protection and not the protection of due
33. Supra note 14.
34. Supra note 12.
35. "The True Meaning of the Term 'Liberty' in those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitu-
tions which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property,' " 4 Harv." L. Rev. 365.
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process in depriving any person of them. Of course, "process" has
long since been tortured into "substance" or "reasonableness," but
the significance of the foregoing summary is that the conclusion of
the article is a prophecy that if "liberty" is to be given the unhistori-
cal and arbitrary meaning which includes "civil rights" in a limited
sense it will be given an even larger meaning. If "civil rights" include
the right to pursue any lawful trade they must also include the right
to worship, print, speak, and exercise one's political privileges in any
lawful nanner. Warren"6 and Green" bring this hpyothesis up to the
present.
In short, the Cantwell case represents a torsion of the language of
the Constitution in two aspects: deprivation of liberty (according to
Shattuck, freedom of locomotion and no more) carries with it pro-
hibition of the free exercise of religion; and prohibition of the free
exercise of religion can be accomplished if done by due process, which
means that the prohibition must be substantively reasonable as well
as "due" in its "process." The absolute command of the First Amend-
ment to make no law38 is reflected in the clear and present danger test
imported into the Fourteenth Amendment 9 when infringements of
freedom of religion are measured by due process. But the general
scorn of constitutional lawyers for canons of construction impels a
jurisprudential approach which finds justification for the expansion
of "liberty" and acceptance of the now settled lack of meaning of
"process" in terms of a national interest in the protection of minority
groups, asvdistinguished from a mere public interest in such protec-
tion. In any case to discuss the merits of First Amendment incorpora-
tion into the Fourteenth would be not only academic but beyond the
scope of this paper. It may not be too late, however, to suggest that
the results of that incorporation in the case of religion have not been
altogether happy in so far as consistency and predictability are con-
cerned.
Hardly had the ink dried on the opinion in the Cantwell case,
unanimously decided, when in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,"
Mr. Justice Stone wrote a dissenting opinion and Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds concurred in the decision of the majority without agreeing
with the opinion. In fifteen cases41 in which opinions were handed
down in the succeeding six years there were ten in which there were
dissents. There were four five-to-four decisions, and perhaps five, de-
36. Op. cit., supra note 1.
37. "Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment," 27 Wash. U. L. Q. 497 (1942), and 28 Wash.
U. L. Q. 251 (1943).
38. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; . . . "
39. " . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; . . .
40. 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
41. See table, page 159. Further citation of these cases will be omitted.
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pending on which side Mr. Justice Frankfurter meant to take in the
Struthers case.
It is convenient to classify the case in three groups: those which
involve a discretionary licensing system or an outright prohibition;
those which involve a tax; and those which involve the requirement
of a test oath, or its equivalent. The Cantwell case is an example of
the first, the Cox case of the second, and the Gobitis case of the third.
The greatest degree of unanimity was achieved in the Cantwell
group, which contains five unanimous decisions and only one, pos-
sibly none, of the five to four variety. In Cantwell the dictum was
that: "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not . . . communication
of information or opinion .... and its punishment as a criminal act
would raise no questions . 42 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire this
dictum became the law of the case, because a person claiming to be a
preacher was convicted under a "fighting words" statute for calling a
public officer a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist."
The decision to affirm was unanimous and all concurred in the opin-
ion of the Court, which was the only opinion written. Justices Byrnes
and Jackson had replaced Justices McReynolds and Stone, who was
elevated to succeed Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, since Cantwell. Mr.
Justice Byrnes had resigned when the next two unanimous, single-
opinion cases came down. They were Largent v. Texas and Jamison v.
Texas. Largent was very similar to Cantwell in that it involved a
discretionary licensing scheme applicable to booksellers, but it lacked
even the specific provision for judicial review of denial of a license
present in the Cantwell case. Jamison did, however, represent an addi-
tional step in protection. A prohibition against distribution of hand-
bills advertising religious literature for sale and a religious meeting
to which no admission charge was made, was struck down. Thereto-
fore the subject matter had been more or less ideological in character,
rather than mere advertising. The fifth unanimous decision, with but
a single opinion, came down three months later, concurrently with
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. It was Taylor
v. Mississippi, which followed Fiske v. Kansas in holding that since
the flag salute could not be made compulsory under the Barnette case
advocacy of refusal to salute the flag could not be made the basis of
conviction of a crime since nothing unlawful was advocated.
In the meantime, however, the harmony of the Court had foundered
on the case of Martin v. Struthers. Three majority opinions were writ-
ten, and two for the minority. Mr. Justice Frankfurter attained the
curious posture of apparently agreeing with the majority and at the
same time joining in the opinion of a dissenter. The question was
42. 310 U. S. 296, 309-310.
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whether the city of Struthers, Ohio, could make it a crime to summon
the occupant of a house by means of a doorbell, or otherwise, to dis-
tribute leaflets advertising a religious meeting. Mr. Justice Black, for
the Court, pointed out that statutes could be drawn which would pro-
tect the householder from unwanted visitors, such as a trespass after
warning statute, or from criminals posing as canvassers, such as
public registration and identification requirements, and concluded that
the ordinance unduly restricted dissemination of ideas even though
the inhabitants were industrial workers sleeping at odd hours. Mr.
Justice Murphy, who joined in the opinion of the Court added that
the ordinance offended the guaranty of freedom of religion by strik-
ing at an age-old method of proselyting. Justices Douglas and Rut-
ledge agreed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to have been inclined
to believe, without being willing to decide, that the Court held the
ordinance to be discriminatory, and he conceded that if it was he would
agree with the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Reed, with whom
Justices Roberts and Jackson joined, saw the ordinance as a fair
adjustment between distributors and householders, and as a legiti-
mate means of abating a nuisance. Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, protested that the Court had thrown into the
scale against the ordinance a hypothetically hospitable householder,
which was contrary to the evidence. He disagreed that an ordinance
could be more narrowly drawn and suggested that this majority argu-
ment were mere makeweight. He asserted that the definition of the
rights of the municipality was lacking in forthrightness, that ministry
to congregations .voluntarily attending services was not parallel to
itinerant evangelists going from door to door, and that the First
Amendment assures religious teaching no more license than secular
discussion.
Near unanimity was achieved at the next term in Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, when all of the Court except Mr. Justice Murphy abandoned
a latitudinarian protection of the exercise of religion in favor of the
authority of the state to prevent a parent from allowing his son under
twelve years of age or his daughter under eighteen to sell religious
literature (or black boots, or vend newspapers, etc.) on the streets.
Mr. Justice Rutledge, for the Court, found that there is a clear and
present danger to the state in the corrupt influences and physical dan-
gers to which children in the streets are subject when carrying on the
activity under consideration, whether or not called selling. The con-
clusion was that the statute was not too broadly drawn even though
the parent accompanied the child and though the activity if conducted
by an adult alone would not be subject to state interference. Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson, with whom Justices Roberts and Frankfurter joined,
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dissented from the grounds of affirming the state court judgment.
His opinion was that this activity had been in prior decisions given
constitutional protection and that if those decisions were right the
opinion of the Court was wrong either in allowing the state to apply
child labor laws to it or in refusing to concede that they should also
be applied to altar boys, youthful choristers, etc. He would not draw
the line at age but rather between religious activities which concern
only members of the faith and auxiliary secular activities. Mr. Jus-
tice Murphy's dissent was based on the same difficulty. He would
not draw a line based on age either, but would deny that the danger
was immediate and protect a child in his orderly worship of God on
the streets.
Two years later a cleavage slightly different from that in the
Struthers case appeared. In two cases decided in January, 1946,
Marsh v. Alabama and Tucker v. Texas, the validity of statutes
making it a crime to remain on premises after being asked to leave
was questioned. The "trespasser" in each case was an orderly dis-
tributor of religious literature. The "premises" were located in com-
pany towns laid out for normal community life, in one case by a
private corporation, in another by the United States. The Court, in
opinions by Mr. Justice Black, held that the statute could not con-
stitutionally be so applied, that the property interests of the owners
of land which is used for municipal purposes are not determinative
of whether dissemination of information and the exercises of religion
can be barred from such areas. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in concur-
ring opinions, agreed that a company owned town is first a town, in
adjusting relations of the kind before the court, that state determina-
tions of local property questions were not controlling, but disagreed
with arguments drawn from restrictions of the Commerce Clause on
state commercial regulation. Mr. Justice Reed dissented on the ground
that a trespasser could not possibly be expressing his views in orderly
fashion, a requisite of constitutional protection. A comparison with
the judicial mosaic in the Struthers case discloses that Mr. Justice
Frankfurter more firmly concurs, bowing to precedent, that Mr. Jus-
tice Burton succeeded Mr. Justice Roberts not only on the bench but
in his views in this case, and that Mr. Chief Justice Stone has crossed
the line, dissenting with Justices Reed and Burton. It is difficult to .see
how the late Chief Justice could have dissented here when in the
Struthers case it would not have been an impossible feat to rationalize
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that persons who rang doorbells to disseminate propaganda were by
the ordinance made trespassers. 3
With the exception of the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Murphy in the Struthers case, and some of the language in the Prince
case, this group of cases could have been decided solely on the basis
of freedom of speech and press. It is necessary only to recognize that
human personality gives of itself communicatively in many fields of
ideas and emotion not for profit, in order to phrase the central prob-
lem of all these cases in terms of freedom of communication or ex-
pression. Troublesome difficulties about what is a place of worship,
and more fundamentally what is the exercise of religion, will not then
have to be decided by a secular tribunal in which it seems the mem-
bers gallantly go to the defense of religions which attack their own
personal faiths, as in the case of Mr. Justice Murphy, and then mem-
bers of a different faith take up the defense of the faith of a colleague,
as in the case of Mr. Justice Jackson.4
The second group of cases is like the first, except that instead of
the activity being wholly banned or subjected to the discretion of a
licensing officer, it is taxed by means of a non-discretionary licensing
scheme violation of which is a crime. These cases contain only one
unanimous opinion, three five-to-four decisions, and one vote of six to
three. The difficulty a secular organ of government has in defining
the exercise of religion as above suggested is apparent in the dis-
cordant pattern of these cases. The Court was the same as that in the
Cantwell case, except that Mr. Justice McReynolds had retired,
when Cox v. New Hampshire was decided in a unanimous opinion
written by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes. It held that a city could re-
cuire registration and payment in advance of a fee of not to exceed
3oo Der day as a condition precedent to holding a parade through
the city streets, and that this requirement could be applied to an
orderly parade which provoked no breaches of the peace and partici-
pants in which took part from a sense of religious obligation. Public
order requires that the city have authority to determine the times,
places, and manner of a parade, if the determination is made impar-
tially and for the purpose of maximum use of the streets. The fee ar-
rangement was held to be one which would tend to conserve the liberty
sought, since it was to be assessed on the basis of the actual cost of
43. Of course this was the very kind of statute approved by the majority in the Struthers case.
In that case the will of the landowner was not determinative of the offense, but the landowner
was not complaining of being deprived of his choice of doorbell-ringers. The real problem here is
how much alteration takes place in the relationship between a person and "his" land when he
use3 it for a town site but retains "possession" under state law. Mr. Chief Justice Stone simply
,'dher d to the general and traditional view of the common law that interests in land are given a
high degree of protection. He followed the general tendency of modern law to assimilate corpora-
tions to private individuals no matter what the question involved. But quaere: Could the shipbuild-
ing corporation have forbidden residents of its town to convene in a mass meeting in a "public"
park to petition for incorporation within the city limits of Mobile,
44. And note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter of a minority group defends the rights of the majority.
References to these justices is occasioned by reading the Struthers opinions.
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permitting the activity in terms of extra policing, and not for revenue.
The conclusion is that the state can recoup its expenses incident to the
preservation of order in connection with free speech a~d religion;
that is, speech and religion can be made to pay their way for any direct
governmental outlays on their behalf.
At the next term, the Chaplinsky Court anticipated the cleavage
which was to appear in Struthers in the case of Jones v. Opelika. The
question was whether the requirement of paying its way was to be
applied to the dissemination of information and the exercise of religion
to the extent of exacting a license fee for general revenue purposes.
The majority, Justices Reed, Roberts, Frankfurter, Byrnes, and Jack-
son, which later became a minority by the resignation of Mr. Justice
Byrnes and appointment of Mr. Justice Rutledge, held that so long as
the fee is reasonable and non-discriminatorily applicable to the ordi-
nary commercial phases of transactions which partake more of com-
merce than religion or education, it may be exacted for the general
expenses of government. The minority, later to become majority,
joined in two opinions. The opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Stone con-
tended that the majority was in error in its treatment of a provision
for arbitrary revocation of the license contained in one of the ordi-
nances. The fact that the appellant had not applied for a license
ought not to prevent the Court from finding on the face of the ordi-
nances an arbitrary weapon in the hands of the licensing officer, in the
absence of a state construction of the separability clause. In this opin-
ion, it was not conceded that any non-discriminatory tax based on
gross receipts collected for religious or educational purposes could be
levied.45 From such a position, it was argued that a flat tax unrelated
to the extent of activities or amount of collections would be even
worse, and was prohibited as to interstate commerce. Mr. Justice
Murphy in the other opinion emphasized the purpose of the collection
of funds as determinative of the character of the activity and the
burdensome effect of a tax unrelated to ability to pay or to the cost
of regulating the activity. On the latter aspect he pointed to the his-
tory of the odious stamp taxes of Revolutionary times exacted for
purely revenue purposes. Not only is the pamphlet an historic weapon
for impecunious but militant minorities, but the use of religious books
45. There is disagreement in limine on whether, since the appellant did not raise the question of
a tax invidiously aimed at speech or the exercise of religion below, or a tax tending to constrict
speech or the exercise of religion, it is proper for the Court to find as a fact that this is such a tax.
It seems clear that the provision for arbitrary revoct 'n sh-l H be open to inspection notwith-
standing the failure of appellant to apply for and obtain a license. Thornhill v. Alabama, su--a
note 7. But us to the exaction of a tax, a distinction should he made as to what is t bn
_ 
taxed.
It is clear that this tax is not levied on propagation of information or gospel as such. Si long as no
col!ection of funds, whether by appeal to give a contribution or t- buy a book. is present, no tax
eculd be levied. If so, should not the defendant have to show. and the state have the opp--t"- ity
to negative. that the tax was suppressive? The Thornhill doctrine becomes unmanageable and leads
to judicial speculation on matters for which evidence could be adduced, if carried too far. But the
dissenting opinion either put taxation or funds-raising activities in the same category as prohibi-
tion of the activities they support, or make no distinction, at least when they are conducted simul-
tneouslv.
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is an old and effective mode of worship and means of proselytizing.
The right to carry a gospel to every living creature is even more dear
to many individuals than free speech and press are important to a free
citizenry."
A year later Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Justices Douglas, Black,
Murphy and Rutledge vacated the prior judgment and reversed the
judgment of the state court, against the dissent of the former major-
ity members which was expressed in two opinions. Mr. Justice Reed,
who had written for the Court before, wrote one of them in which
he emphasized that other questions would be raised if it were con-
tended that the fees were excessive in amount or discriminatorily
enacted or applied. He distinguished a tax on voluntary contributions
and characterized the sale of Watchtower publications, along with
sponsoring bazaars or selling Bibles to raise money for religious pur-
poses, as commercial. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson
agreed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter gave an opinion which Mr. Justice
Jackson concurred. He met the argument of the majority against a
flat tax with the contention that such a tax would be unconstitutional
if it had been shown that it was oppressive in its effect, and that no
constitutional distinction could be made on the basis of the purpose
of the tax. Nice distinctions cannot be made as to how public revenues
are disbursed. This flat tax only imposed a burden commensurate with
the benefits received from government.
At the same day the decision in Murdock v. Pennsylvania came
down, with Mr. Justice Douglas writing for the Court, which adopted
the views of the minority in Opelika I. The "high, constitutional posi-
tion" of the liberties of itinerant evangelists was restored. No tax
can be levied by a state for privileges guaranteed by the federal con-
stitution." Lack of allocation to, and admeasurement by, policing ex-
penses is fatal to the tax. The activity in question is more like passing
a collection plate in church than huckstering and peddling wares and
merchandise. The dissenting opinions of Justices Reed and Frank-
furter have been summarized in connection with Opelika II and of
Mr. Justice Jackson in connection with Struthers, decided the same
day.
46. This opinion clearly regards the two aspects of the transaction as indistinguishable constitu-
tionally. Mr. Justice Stone's opinion emphasizes the purpose rather than the quality of the activities.
47. This interesting logic is parallel to the assertion sometimes made (see 41 Mich. L. Rev. 323
(1942)) that in Opelika I freedom of religion was balanced against a social value no higher than
the public need for revenue. The same reasoning could be applied to the Cox case. The subject of
taxation there was not the expression, but the burden on the local community of the overt acts
employed by the taxpayer as a means of making the expression of opinion or information effective.
In the Opelika-Murdock group of cases the subject of the tax is the burden on the local community
of the overt acts employed by the taxpayer to finance his expression of opinion or information. The
difference is that this tax is for general revenue purposes rather than the cost of policing. Does it
follow that such a tax is necessarily restrictive of speech or religion? It might be pointed out that
the cash collections came from Ceasar and were tangibly secular rather than spiritual, however
much an act of devotion soliciting the contributions was to the collector. After Murdock it may be
asked whether the principal of the Cox case is restricted to its facts; and how far the source of
revenue must be removed from the propagation of information, to be subject to taxation.
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One case in this group remains: Follett v. McCormick. The cleavage
of Murdock and Struthers remained, except that Mr. Justice Reed
accepted Murdock and Ophelia II as law and wrote a concurring opin-
ion. The Court, through Mr. Justice Douglas, held that the town of
McCormick, South Carolina, could not levy a license tax on book
agents doing business in the town so as to make it applicable to a
resident full-time evangelist who made his living by "selling" reli-
gious books (in the same manner as in Cantwell and the other cases).
Mr. Justice Murphy added that calling such a result a subsidy of
religion meant no more than that substance was given to constitu-
tional rights. He distinguished between: essentially religious activi-
ties; and investments made for profit, though that profit be devoted
to religious causes. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson wrote
a joint opinion to the effect that this situation went further than Mur-
dock, on the ground that there the tax was oppressive, or was so
deemed by the Court because applicable to itinerant evangelists.
Thus in this group of cases, also, the difficulty of determining what
is an exrcise of religion played havoc with doctrine and the change of
Court personnel in one seat48 changed the result while leaving the rule
more than ever in doubt. One might hazard that it is better to avoid
the necessity of harnessing two judicial passions, one for freedom of
speech and the other for freedom of religion, if leaving freedom of
religion out of the picture would achieve a more certain protection
of similar interests under the heading of freedom of speech. The more
precious the interests involved, the greater the desirability of precise
delimitation of their extent. It would be clearly understandable that
no informational activity, including or not including advertisements
of informational activity or books, could be taxed, except in the Cox
manner, i. e., for the additional expense of policing required, but such
is clearly not the rule and nothing else clearly is.
The next group of cases is different in kind from the others. It in-
volves a requirement by the state of an affirmative declaration of state
of mind or belief, in short, a test oath. In two cases, one overruling
the other, it is a flag salute. In another, it is a declaration of willing-
ness to bear arms and otherwise use force in defense of the state. In
the two cases it is made a condition to remaining in public schools
at an age when school attendance is required. In the third it is made a
prerequisite of admission to practice law.
The Gobitis case was the first case in which the Court discussed the
power of a state to exact a flag salute as a prerequisite of access to the
public schools. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the Court, said that the
interest of national unity, which is the basis of national security, is as
48. Mr. Justice Rutledge for Mr. Justice Byrnes.
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important a legal value as there is, and that the Court are not suffi-
ciently competent as psychologists to overturn the legislative deter-
mination that this method is the best for the promotion of national
unity. Mr. Justice Stone, the sole dissenter, said that other ways could
be found which would not command a violation of religious convic-
tions. The legislative judgment should be subjected to as careful scrut-
iny when religious convictions are involved as when the remedial
channels of political agitation are threatened. Justices Black, Murphy,
and Douglas expressed agreement with him two years later when he,
then Chief Justice, led the dissent in the first Opelika case. There-
fore, when the Murdock Court was presented with the case of West
Virginia State Board v. Barnette there was a majority, with the addi-
tion of Mr. Justice Rutledge, for overruling the Gobitlfs case. But
Mr. Justice Jackson also joined the Murdock majority to make the
vote six to three and write the opinion of the Court. That left Jus-
tices Roberts, Reed, and Frankfurter in their original position- The
majority opinion emphasized that the conflict is not among individuals
but between authority and the individuals, that no clear and present
danger was shown to be created by remaining passive during a flag
salute ritual. Compulsion to coerce coherence is doomed to achieve
the unanimity of the graveyard if successful, and questions of com-
petence of the justices are irrelevant when state authority invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit. Justices Black and Douglas explained
their new alignment by stating that though they were reluctant to
make the Constitution a rigid bar against state regulation of conduct
and still believed that reluctance a sound principle, it was wrongly
applied in Gobitis. Mr. Justice Murphy also added that official com-
pulsion to affirm what is contrary to one's religious beliefs is the
antithesis of freedom of worship.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, apparently not joined by his fellow dis-
senters, was left to defend the original position of the Court alone.
His opinion was as follows: Private notions of policy should be ex-
cluded altogether from the bench. There is no appeal from failure
to employ judicial self-restraint. The Court has no supervisory powers
over legislation and no means of rewriting legislation. It can but
nullify it. Dissidents cannot justifiably claim immunity from civic
measures of general applicability because of conscientious scruples.
This measure is civic, not religious. The Hamilton case cannot satis-
factorily be distinguished. In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "The
right of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the
powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government." Can
similar objections now be successfully urged against the following
activities in public schools: Bible reading? teaching evolution? chau-
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vinistic teaching of history? The clear and present danger test is
applicable only when the state forbids the use of certain kinds of
language, or advocacy, and not when it requires affirmative action by
the individual. Nor is this an oath test; it suppresses no belief; the
participants in the ceremony may disavow as publicly as they please
the meaning others attach to the meaning of the salute. Only the two
most recent appointees to the bench have not at least once before
passed on such a requirement favorably. The liberal spirit cannot be
enforced by judicial invalidation of illiberal legislation. This Court
has reached the outer and forbidden limits of judicial review.
When a state requirement for admission to semi-public office came
before the Court in the case of In re Summers not only did Mr. Jus-
tice Jacksofl rejoin the Murdock minority but the original dissenter
in this group, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, anticipating his position in
Marsh and Tucker, altered his alignment, and the result was a five-to-
four decision. Mr. Justice Reed wrote for the Court that refusal to
promise to serve in the armed forces if called upon for militia duty,
to which men of his age were subject by state law, is equivalent to the
refusal to take courses in.military tactics in the Hamilton case, and is
the same as the valid Congressional requirement for admission to
citizenship. Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas, Murphy,
and Rutledge, insisted that the semi-public position is analogous to
the attendance at school in the Barnette case. Quakers under this
requirement- could not practice law in Illinois, the state involved.
Language from the dissenting opinions in Schwinner v. U. S.4 , and
Macintosh v. U. S." was quoted with approval. Willingness to bear
arms is no more appropriate for practicing law than working as a
plumber or prison chaplain.
Were it not for In re Summers it might have been assumed that,
the minority in Barnette having been reduced to three, the law for the
test oath group after a false start had been settled. Waxing confusion,
however, characterizes this group perhaps even more than the tax
group. Affirmative pressure to make a declaration which would violate
the beliefs of some people was greater perhaps in the Barnette and
Gobitis cases than in the Summers case, because it is easily conceivable
that in a particular case a child could not for financial reasons be sent
to a private school, which would expose the parent of the conscientious
objector as well as the objector himself to the force of the state. On
the other hand, at most all the prospective lawyer has lost is the in-
vestment in his education of time and money, and he can salvage
part of that by going into another state or another occupation where
49. 279 U. S. 644 (1928).
50. 283 U. S. 605 (1931). These cases involve the First Amendment proper, on whether Congress
can deny naturalization to persons who will not declare willingness to bear arms. Mr. Justice
Holmes leads the dissent.
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the same requirement is not made. Furthermore, the qualifications
of lawyers are intimately related to the public interest, so that greater
coercion would be justified. The minimum of coercion is present in
the Hamilton case, because that compulsion is represented by the
share of taxes paid by the parties which is devoted to the state uni-
versity. The Hamilton case is not exactly in point; however, because
no declaration of belief or state of mind was there required.
For the sake of symmetry it might be possible to consider the test
oath group also as freedom of expression cases, under the subheading
of freedom not to speak. But then a distinction would have to be made
between official 'requirements of informational reports necessary for
the business of government and statements of belief presumably neces-
sary for the purity of the public or official mind.
However, there is unexplored vitality in the language of the Four-
teenth Amendment which if properly employed would make super-
fluous the logomachy of incorporating the absolute terminology of
the First Amendment within the due process requirement of the
Fourteenth. It is possible to allow "liberty" to settle back into its
historical place in the habeas corpus tradition, as "the principle of
non-interference has withered '"' in economic regulation and prac-
tically taken away the means of liberty of contract or liberty to pursue
an occupation from the meaning of that "liberty." A genuine basis
for inquiry into the substantive content and mode of application of
state legislation is supplied by the phrase "equal protection of the
laws."52 It carries with it a legitimate meaning singularly appropriate
to the national protection of minority groups from state oppression.
Using it as a springboard a new judicial beginning may be made, in
which the confusions attendant upon determining whether a minority
group is unified on the basis of religion or politics, race or nationality,
economics or sociology, can be ignored.
Undertaking to prevent state denial of the equal protection of the
laws obviously would not provide a mechanical solution which would
make unnecessary the qualities of wisdom and astuteness in making
qualitative judgments of policy so essential in judicial -review of state
legislation, however convenient it might be for the Court to leave
questions of constitutionality entirely to the legislatures. But such an
approach might focus the questions of fact within a manageable
51. The language is that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the Barnette case, 319 U. S.
624. 640.
52. ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The writer
is not unaware that the due process clause has for the most part eclipsed the rest of this section
of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra note 13. It is also
obvious that this proposal entails not only a continuation of the necessary legalistic refinement of
precedent in the books, but a broad and daring application of judicial review to state legislation,
on complaint of a member of a minority group, to inspect the legislative structure of a given state
as a whole. The complainant, however, should be required to demonstrate the lack of symmetry
which operates upon him oppressively, both in law and in fact.
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compass on a secular level for the bench and bar. How is it possible
for a civil court to say whether religion is involved when the regulated
party asserts that it is and the state denies it? A board of philosophers
would probably disagree with equal vehemence. Certainly the judges
on plural courts do.
Practical operation of the new approach would entail recognition
that the prohibitions of the First Amendment are more specific than
those of the Fourteenth, but it would not necessarily alter the results
in cases like Cantwell, Largent, Jamison, and Taylor on the one hand,
or Cox and Prince on the other. Pamphlets would still be said to be
for the underprivileged what full-page newspaper adv ertising or radio
messages about "private enterprise" are for the mighty. Consequently,
regulation which bears unequally in the two categories would result in
"unreasonable classification." The little man' as well as the big man
must pay his part of the costs of government and submit to police
regulation for the welfare of his children. The problems exemplified
by.Opelika, Murdock, and McCormick and by Struthers, Marsh, and
Tucker would remain knotty situations, in which interest must be
balanced, but the central question would be whether there is persecu-
tion, and by whom, as Mr. Justice Jackson so pointedly asked in his
Murdock dissent.
Finally, the lessons of great opinions in this field should not be
ignored. Not only must each case be judged by the evidence in it,
but where unpopular persons or causes are involved the record is
suspect, and the language of the statute in the light of its purposes
and the availability of other means for the attainment of legitimate
ends must be carefully considered. Above all, respect for the private
judgment of any man, be he the President of the United States or
the humblest of alien immigrants, should preclude constitutional
toleration of the attempt of any state to use any degree of official
coercion which tempts one to stultify his conscience by stating posi-
tively that which he does not believe to be true about his political,
religious, economic, or social beliefs. Private opinion or judgment
cannot thwart the processes of government, but a test oath is a slip-
shod and unreliable means of discovering a personal belief. Necessity
in this case dictates that where it is in the legitimate public interest
to know a man's beliefs they must be determined by his actions.
Otherwise the possessors of "habits of hypocrisy and meanness" have
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